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Abstract
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) have presented evidence supporting
a role of genetic distance to the United States as a barrier to economic
development. We extend their empirical work by controlling for the
share of Europeans and European descendants in the population. We
nd that the role of genetic distance disappears and o¤er two alterna-
tive interpretations of the patterns in the data.
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The economics literature has begun to take advantage of genetic data in
order to explain di¤erent economic phenomena.1 A particularly intriguing
possibility is that genetic di¤erences may play a role in explaining di¤erences
in economic development, an idea that has been advanced by Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009) - henceforth SW. These authors show that a countrys
genetic distance to the world technological leader, the United States, is a
powerful predictor of its income per capita. This note qualies the results
of SW by subjecting them to some additional empirical testing.
Economics, University of Glasgow. Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT, United
Kingdom. Email: luis.angeles@glasgow.ac.uk . Tel: +44 141 330 8517.
1See, for instance, Guiso et al. (2009), Giuliano et al. (2006) and Desmet et al. (2009).
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SW have been careful to point out that "our results provide no evidence
for a direct e¤ect of specic genes on income or productivity" (p. 470, italics
in the original). Their mechanism relies instead in an assumed relationship
between genetic and cultural distance. As they point out, genetic distance is
a good proxy for the time since two populations have diverged from a single,
parent population. The authors then assume that the longer the time since
divergence the greater the chances that these populations have developed
di¤erent cultural practices (or, more generally, di¤erent intergenerationally
transmitted traits, which may be cultural or biological). The nal piece of
the mechanism is that cultural di¤erences act as "barriers to the di¤usion
of development" because "more closely related societies are more likely to
learn from each other and adopt each others innovations" (Spolaore and
Wacziarg 2009, p. 470). Thus, genetic/cultural distance with respect to the
world technological leader would make economic development di¢ cult.
SW do not o¤er any direct evidence of their hypothesized links between
genetic and cultural distance or between cultural distance and technological
adoption or economic success. Instead, the authors focus on the reduced-
form relationship between genetic distance to the United States and income
per capita and present a large array of econometric results that support their
story. Most of their results are obtained using country pairs as the unit of
analysis and controlling for alternative explanations of long-run economic
development such as geography, climate, colonial past, and measurable as-
pects of culture such as language and religion.2
SW are worthy of much praise for their innovative use of genetic data
and their careful handling of the empirical analysis. The economics literature
will probably gain much from further extending in the direction marked by
these and other authors. We will, however, beg to di¤er with the overall
conclusions of SW. As we argue below, a simple extension to their empirical
framework shows their results are less robust than at rst sight.
2For some attempts at measuring cultural di¤erences beyond language and religion see
Fearon (2003), Linders et al. (2005) and Tadesse and White (2010a, 2010b).
2
***
The genetic distance between two given countries in the world can be
predicted to a large extent by answering two questions. First, is either of
them an African country? Second, to what extend is their population of
European descent?
The rst question sets African and non-African countries aside. This
makes sense because non-Africans are a subgroup of Africans in terms of
genetic diversity, a consequence of the pattern of evolution and di¤usion
of homo sapiens throughout the world.3 As a consequence, the genetic
distance between two non-African countries is typically smaller that the
genetic distance between an African and a non-African country.
The second question recognizes the ubiquity and importance of the Eu-
ropean colonial expansion over the last few centuries. Colonialism brought
large number of European settlers abroad, modifying and in some cases com-
pletely changing the genetic composition of some nations - the United States
among them.4
It is thus the case that being an African country is a powerful predictor
of a large genetic distance vis-a-vis the Untied States while having a large
European population is a powerful predictor of a small genetic distance to
this same country. The importance of these two factors can be appreciated
in table 1, where they are used as explanatory factors of the genetic distance
3The spread of modern humans out of Africa took place in migratory waves which gave
rise to the "serial founder e¤ect" of population genetics. In short, only a small sample
of the initial African population migrated to Eurasia where new virgin lands allowed it
to multiply its numbers and create a whole new population. This initial migratory group
contained only a subsample of the genetic variation within Africa, resulting in a much
reduced level of genetic diversity in Eurasia as compared to Africa. For a similar reason,
Amerindians can be seen as a subgroup of Eurasians in terms of genetic diversity.
4See Putterman and Weil (2010) for a full account of population movements between
countries since 1500. As is clear from their gure 2, Europeans dominated such movements.
For other consequences of European settlement on present-day socioeconomic outcomes
see Angeles (2007) on income inequality and Angeles and Neanides (2009, 2011) on aid
e¤ectiveness and corruption.
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Table 1
Explaining genetic distance
Dependent variable: Genetic distance to the United States
(1) (2) (3)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.082 0.064
(0.007)** (0.007)**
Share of Europeans and European
descendants in the population -0.076 -0.050
(0.006)** (0.005)**
Observations 180 178 178
R2 0.48 0.39 0.63
Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at
the 5% and 1% level.
of each country to the United States in simple OLS regressions. Not only
are these two factors statistically signicant predictors at the 1% level, but
together they explain 63% of the variation in genetic distance across the
world.5
***
To their credit, SW subject their results to the inclusion of a dummy
variable for sub-Saharan African countries. This is a reasonable test to make
because many things set African countries aside other than a large genetic
distance to the United States. SW mainly refer to Diamond (1997), who
masterly documented the biological and geographic handicaps that hindered
Africas transition from hunther-gathering to agriculture. Additional factors
contributing to Africas long-standing economic backwardness are the high
prevalence of infectious diseases (McNeill 1976, Gallup et al. 1999) and the
many centuries of the slave trade (Nunn 2008).
SW nd that their qualitative results continue to hold when controlling
for African countries, although the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of
5Please refer to the appendix for data sources and denitions, including an explanation
of the measure of genetic distance.
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genetic distance falls by about one third (tables IV and V in their paper).
They interpret this result as evidence that "Diamonds hypothesis on the
long term di¤usion of economic development is complementary to ours" (p.
504).
What SW do not control for, however, is the prevalence of Europeans
or European descendants within the population. One may understand why,
had they been aware of the importance of this variable in explaining genetic
distance, they would have chosen not to include it in their regressions. A
large share of Europeans in the population and a close genetic distance to the
United States are closely related concepts. It may well be that the share of
Europeans in the population is positively related to economic development
precisely because of Spolaore and Wacziargs story: small genetic distance,
small cultural distance, smooth transfer of ideas.
To this argument we have two answers. First, it may also be that the
success of countries of European population is explained by factors other
than culturally-facilitated technological transmission. European settlers had
higher levels of human and physical capital and had already acquired a
familiarity with modern European technology by the time they went abroad.
They also took their laws and institutions with them, which could result
in economic development independently of technological transmissions.6 If
these were the mechanism at work then it would make sense to control for
Europeans and European descendants when estimating the e¤ects of genetic
distance.
The second answer is even simpler. Let us accept, in accordance with
Spolaore and Wacziarg, that countries with an European population are
rich because their close genetic and cultural distance with the United States
(and Europe) allowed them to use their ideas. We would still want to know
whether this mechanism is in place for countries with no European popula-
tion. According to table 1, we would still have 37% of the variation in genetic
distance to the United States once we control for sub-Saharan Africa and for
6See Acemoglu et al. (2001), Glaeser et al. (2004) and the related literature.
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the share of Europeans and their descendants in the population. The genetic
characteristics of Asia, North Africa and the Pacic are not explained by
either of these two variables. Is the thesis of Spolaore and Wacziarg relevant
for them?
***
As we mentioned above, most of the results in SW are obtained using
country pairs as the unit of analysis. This approach increases the number
of available observations from about 150 in a standard cross-country setting
to 10,000 or more observations of country pairs. We will thus focus on their
preferred empirical specication, which we reproduce below:
jlog yi   log yj j = 0 + 1GRij + 2Xij + ij (1)
In equation (1) jlog yi   log yj j is the di¤erence, in absolute value, of the
logarithm of income per capita between countries i and j, GRij is the relative
genetic distance with respect to the United States and Xij a set of control
variables measuring alternative determinants of long-run development. If we
denote the genetic distance between countries i and j by GDij , the relative
genetic distance between two countries with respect to the United States is
dened as GRij =
GDi;US  GDj;US :
Our set of control variables will take into account the e¤ects of geog-
raphy, climate and some aspects of culture - all of which have been con-
sidered by SW in one way or another. We include the absolute latitude of
a country; a dummy for landlocked countries; dummies for former colonies
of Britain, France, Spain or Portugal, and any other country; the share of
English, French, and Spanish or Portuguese speakers; and the share of the
population professing the Protestant, Catholic and Muslim religions. All
these variables are included after taking the absolute value of the di¤erence
between countries i and j: Note that for a dummy variable like being land-
locked the result is a new dummy taking a value of 0 if either both countries
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are landlocked or none of them is landlocked, and a value of 1 otherwise.
Such variable would capture the income distance resulting from a di¤erence
in that particular trait.
Our results are summarized in table 2. The rst two columns of this
table reproduce the central nding of SW: relative genetic distance to the
United States has a positive, sizeable and statistically signicant e¤ect on
income di¤erences when used as the sole regressor (column 1) and with an
important set of control variables (column 2). The estimated coe¢ cient of
relative genetic distance that we obtain is within the range of results reported
by these authors. A coe¢ cient of 5:123, as in column 2, implies that a one
standard-deviation change in relative genetic distance is associated with a
change in the income gap of 25%.
Column 3 adds a dummy for sub-Saharan Africa (after taking di¤erences
and absolute value as indicated above). The coe¢ cient for this variable takes
the expected positive sign (pairs with one country from sub-Saharan African
tend to have a larger income di¤erence) and is statistically signicant. The
coe¢ cient on relative genetic distance falls by about half with respect to its
previous value but remains large and statistically signicant. This result is
consistent with those obtained by SW in similar regressions and shows that
their thesis survives the hypothesis of African low incomes being caused by
factors unrelated to genetic distance.
Column 4 then adds the share of Europeans and European descendants
in the population. We also include a dummy variable for former USSR
and Warsaw pact countries in order to distinguish between the well-known
income-reducing e¤ect of communism from the otherwise income-increasing
e¤ect of having a European population. This is important since a large
number of European countries lived through much of the 20th century under
a communist regime.
The results of column 4 are noteworthy. As expected, we nd a positive
coe¢ cient on the share of Europeans in the population - large di¤erences
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Table 2
Country pairs regressions
Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative genetic distance to the
United States
6.793 5.123 2.297 0.510
(0.252)** (0.261)** (0.296)** (0.299)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.546 0.578
(0.027)** (0.026)**
Share of Europeans and
European descendants
0.687
(0.033)**
Former USSR or Warsaw Pact -0.599
(0.031)**
Latitude 0.012 0.013 0.007
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Landlocked 0.306 0.293 0.390
(0.024)** (0.023)** (0.023)**
Former British colony -0.046 -0.058 -0.068
(0.023)* (0.022)** (0.022)**
Former French colony 0.059 -0.065 -0.101
(0.026)* (0.027)* (0.026)**
Former Spanish or Port. colony -0.121 -0.171 -0.152
(0.034)** (0.033)** (0.032)**
Other former colonies -0.02 -0.069 -0.034
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
Share of English speakers 0.239 0.281 0.249
(0.034)** (0.032)** (0.033)**
Share of French speakers 0.331 0.367 0.213
(0.064)** (0.068)** (0.067)**
Share or Spanish/Port. speakers -0.098 -0.036 -0.164
(0.039)* (0.038) (0.038)**
Share of Protestants 0.438 0.504 0.423
(0.053)** (0.052)** (0.053)**
Share of Catholics 0.168 0.19 0.161
(0.039)** (0.039)** (0.039)**
Share of Muslims 0.197 0.186 0.174
(0.031)** (0.031)** (0.031)**
Observations 13861 13203 13203 12880
R2 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.18
Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at
the 5% and 1% level.
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in this variable go hand in hand with large income di¤erences. More re-
markable, however, is that in this regression the e¤ect of genetic distance on
economic development is an order of magnitude smaller than in the initial
regressions of columns 1-2 and is no longer statistically signicant.
A moment of reection shows that this makes perfect sense. The genetic
variation that is left is largely given by the countries of Asia, North Africa,
and the Pacic. Genetic data shows that, in accordance with the pattern
of di¤usion of early humans around the globe, geographic distance from
Europe is a very good predictor of genetic distance with respect to Europeans
(and thus with respect to the United States). It follows that within this
group Middle Easterners and Northern Africans are genetically closest to
the United States, followed by people from South Asia, Central Asia, and
nally East Asia and the Pacic. Or, contrary to what genetic distance
would predict, it is well East Asian countries that have experienced the most
economic development within this group, while North Africa and South Asia
have lagged behind. In short, the thesis of SW does not seem to apply to
this important group of countries.
We bring some further support to the case by repeating the above ex-
ercise using traditional cross-country regressions (similar to table 1 in SW).
In this case, the GDP per capita of each country is predicted to be nega-
tively related to its genetic distance with respect to the United States. As
table 3 demonstrates, results parallel those obtained using country pairs.
Once again genetic distance appears to have a strong e¤ect on income lev-
els, an e¤ect that remains in place when we control for sub-Saharan African
countries. Once the share of Europeans and European descendants is in-
cluded, however, genetic distance to the United States appears to be of no
importance.
The results of this note may thus be summarized as follows. From a sta-
tistical perspective, the relationship between genetic distance to the United
States and economic development uncovered by Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) disappears when we add the share of Europeans and their descen-
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Table 3
Cross-country regressions
Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita in 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Genetic distance to the United
States
-16.276 -10.119 -6.326 -0.780
(1.765)** (2.770)** (3.135)* (3.337)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.784 -1.205
(0.308)* (0.351)**
Share of Europeans and
European descendants
1.144
(0.402)**
Former USSR or Warsaw Pact -1.73
(0.274)**
Latitude 0.027 0.027 0.025
(0.010)** (0.010)** (0.012)*
Landlocked -0.892 -0.859 -0.634
(0.224)** (0.217)** (0.186)**
Former British colony 0.53 0.638 0.350
(0.337) (0.333) (0.340)
Former French colony -0.26 -0.007 -0.300
(0.318) (0.312) (0.333)
Former Spanish or Port. colony -0.434 -0.275 -0.375
(0.313) (0.300) (0.318)
Other former colonies -0.273 -0.17 -0.425
(0.446) (0.423) (0.462)
Share of English speakers 0.407 0.157 0.144
(0.316) (0.359) (0.341)
Share of French speakers -0.097 -0.133 -0.395
(0.663) (0.894) (0.836)
Share or Spanish/Port. speakers 0.145 -0.131 -0.400
(0.326) (0.347) (0.336)
Share of Protestants 1.852 1.82 0.908
(0.500)** (0.512)** (0.498)
Share of Catholics 1.466 1.544 1.197
(0.397)** (0.399)** (0.360)**
Share of Muslims 0.092 0.126 0.365
(0.396) (0.390) (0.404)
Observations 167 163 163 161
R2 0.29 0.60 0.62 0.69
Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at
the 5% and 1% level.
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dants in the population as an additional control. This may be interpreted
in two alternative ways. First, the mechanism emphasized by SW is present
in the data and explains the good economic performance of countries with a
European population. But the mechanism is of no relevance to non-African
countries without a European population. Second, the mechanism empha-
sized by SW is not present in the data - the good economic performance of
countries with a European population is due to factors unrelated to genetic
distance. Distinguishing between these two interpretation would require the
use of measures correlated with the degree of Europeans in the population
yet unrelated with genetic distance to the United States. This challenging
task is beyond the scope of the present note and is left for future research.
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Appendix: denitions and data sources
GDP per capita
From the World Banks World Development Indicators (Edition 2010).
Real GDP per capita in US$ of the year 2000, for the year 1995 (in accor-
dance with Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009).
Genetic distance
From Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), who obtain the data from Cavalli-
Sforza et al. (1994). These authors use the measure of genetic distance know
as FST , which can be described as the fraction of total heterozygosity in a
group of two populations that cannot be explained by the average within-
group heterozygosity.
The heterozygosity of a given gene in a population is the probability
that, if we pick up two random observations of that gene in the population,
they will present di¤erent forms of that gene (what is known as the di¤erent
alleles of the gene). Because every person has two versions of every gene
(one from each parent), this measure is also equal to the proportion of people
with di¤erent alleles for their two genes (assuming, of course, that mating
is random with respect to that gene). The measure is then averaged over a
certain number of genes to obtain the overall heterozygosity in a population
(Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994).
Share of Europeans and European descendants in the popula-
tion
From Alesina et al. (2003). We consider as Europeans all groups who
belong to the ethnic majority of a European country (e.g. "Germans",
"Bulgarians" and so on) together with broader classications such as "west-
ern Europeans", "eastern Europeans" or, simply, "Europeans". We do not
consider Turkey and Central Asia as parts of Europe, while all former re-
publics of the Soviet Union west of the Ural mountains are counted in. In
non-European countries, we count as European descendants the groups de-
scribed as "whites". We do not count mestizos or people of other mixed
ethnic backgrounds as European descendants.
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Shares of English, French, and Spanish or Portuguese speakers
From Alesina et al. (2003).
Shares of Protestants, Catholics and Muslims (for the year
1980), Latitude, Landlocked
From La Porta et al. (1999).
Colonial dummies, dummy for former USSR and Warsaw pact
Constructed by the author.
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